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The Duty to Bargain
The legal regulation of the obligation to bargain collectively in both the
private and public sectors has two primary thrusts. The first is concerned with
the mechanics of negotiations and the requirement that the parties negotiate
in good faith. The second concerns the scope of negotiations, i.e., the
determination of what subjects the parties must, upon request, negotiate.
THE OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as originally enacted in
1935, it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain.
There was no similar obligation placed on employee organizations and there
was no statutory definition of what the duty to bargain entailed. The primary
purpose of the NLRA was to get employers to the bargaining table. As the
Senate report stated: "The bill . . . leads them [employee representatives] to
the office door of their employer with the legal authority to negotiate for
their fellow employees. The bill does not go beyond the office door. It leaves
the discussions between the employer and the employee, and the agreements
which they may or may not make, voluntary."
1 The National Labor Relations
Board and the courts, however, soon added certain requirements, such as the
duty to meet at reasonable times and to execute in writing any agreement
reached. Many of these requirements were subsequently incorporated in Sec-
tion 8(d) of the NLRA with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
Section 8(d) states that:
to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times, and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
54
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and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or require the making of a concession. 2
A substantial number of the public sector collective bargaining statutes contain
identical or similar provisions.
3
Parties' Representatives
Virtually all the public sector statutes grant employees the right to
negotiate through representatives of their own choosing. This has been uni-
formly interpreted to mean that the union has the right to select the
individuals who will negotiate with representatives of the employer and that
interference with this right by an employer is an unfair labor practice. Thus,
the fact that an employer finds one or more of the union's representatives
personally objectionable does not ordinarily justify an employer's refusal to
negotiate. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission made the
following comment:
Personal differences arising between the representatives of the parties
engaged in negotiations with respect to wages, hours and working condi-
tions of municipal employes do not constitute a valid reason for refusing
to bargain in good faith. Both municipal employers and representatives
of their employes have the right to designate whomever they choose to
represent them at the bargaining table. To allow either or both parties
to refuse to bargain with each other because of alleged or actual
conflicts between their representatives would be contrary to the intent
and purpose of [the act] ."
4
Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of Labor, in a decision under Executive
Order 11491, ruled that: "the right to choose its representatives at such
discussions must be left to the discretion of the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative and not to the whim of management."5 A good illustration of the
scope of this right lies in a recent decision of the Michigan Employment
Relations Commission which held that a county board of commissioners was
not free to refuse to negotiate merely because the employees' bargaining
representative designated another union as its bargaining agent, since the
bargaining representative was not giving up its right to represent the
employees in question.
6
It should be noted, however, that the size of a
union's bargaining team, especially where negotiations take place on the clock,
is negotiable and that a public employer is within its rights in requesting that
the union negotiate over the size of its bargaining team.
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While employee organizations thus have broad rights to designate their
representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining, this does not
generally include the right to include on their bargaining team individuals who
are excluded from the bargaining unit on the basis of their supervisory and/or
managerial authority. In fact, in many instances public employers would be
committing an unfair labor practice if they negotiated with a union bargaining
committee that included such supervisory or managerial personnel. In this
regard, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission in City of Mil-
waukee stated:
The active participation by supervisory employes in the affairs of an
employe organization could result in impeding and defeating the primary
purpose of the employe organization that of representing municipal
employes in conferences and negotiations concerning their wages, hours
and conditions of employment. Since supervisors are the agents of the
municipal employer, a municipal employer, by permitting supervisory
employes to participate actively, in any manner similar to that described
above, in the affairs of an organization representing employes for the
purposes set forth in Section 111.70, could, in the proper proceedings,
be found to have committed prohibitive practices by interfering,
restraining and coercing its employes in the exercise of their rights
granted to them under the law.
7
While both parties have broad rights in terms of selecting their bar-
gaining representatives, the selected representatives must be clothed with
sufficient authority to engage in meaningful negotiations. The use of repre-
sentatives who do not have any power to agree and who must continually
check back with their principals constitutes bad faith bargaining. This does
not mean, however, that a party's representatives must have authority to reach
binding agreements without any need for ratification. To the contrary, both
parties in the public sector typically take any tentative agreements back to
their principals for ratification. The Michigan Employment Relations Com-
mission stated: "Obviously, the negotiating team must receive instructions
from the governing body and submit oral or written reports to it, if its
concessions and tentative commitments are to be meaningful. ... [I] t need
not, and probably cannot, be vested with final authority to bind the public
employer, since that would seem to involve an illegal delegation of the
lawmaking power of the City Council."
8
Duty to Supply Relevant Information
An employer has a clear duty to furnish relevant data and information
to a union which represents its employees.
9 The courts and the various labor
boards have uniformly held that employers are required upon request to
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furnish unions with sufficient data with respect to wage rates, job classifi-
cations and other related matters in order to permit the union to bargain
intelligently, administer the contract, and prepare for negotiations. In this
regard it should be noted that the "union is not required to show the purpose
of their requested data unless the data appears to be clearly irrelevant."
1
Rather, the burden is on the employer to show that the requested data is not
relevant. An employer is not required to necessarily supply the information in
the same form requested as long as it is submitted in a manner which is not
unreasonably burdensome to interpret.
1 1
Related to the duty to supply information is the obligation of an
employer to supply financial data upon request if an employer pleads inability
to pay higher wages or fringe benefits. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
in a case arising under the NLRA:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either
bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted in-
ability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument is important
enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important
enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy. And it would
certainly not be far-fetched for a trier of fact to reach the conclusion
that bargaining lacks good faith when an employer mechanically repeats
a claim of inability to pay without making the slightest effort to
substantiate the claim.
12
Unilateral Action
Another constituent part of the duty to bargain in good faith is the
requirement that an employer not make unilateral changes in wages, hours or
working conditions which are subject to negotiation without first negotiating
with the union. Thus, the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations
observed that: "it is well recognized that unilateral employer action upon a
matter which is the subject of current collective bargaining between the
parties constitutes a failure and refusal to bargain in good faith upon the issue
in question."
13
In one case, for example, the Connecticut board held that an
employer acted improperly when it unilaterally adopted a new classification
plan while negotiations were in progress.
1 4
However, once an employer has given the union an opportunity to
negotiate over a given proposal and it appears that the parties are at an
impasse, the employer is permitted to unilaterally implement the proposal. In
upholding the right of a board of education to take such unilateral action, the
Connecticut Supreme Court stated that: "it was not the intention of the
legislature to permit progress in education to be halted until agreement is
reached with the union."1 5
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Overall Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith
Although the courts and the various labor boards are not supposed to sit
in judgment concerning the results of negotiations, they do review nego-
tiations to determine whether the parties have in fact negotiated in good faith.
What constitutes good faith bargaining has been variously defined. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court stated in West Hartford Education Ass'n v. Decourcy:
"The duty to negotiate in good faith generally has been defined as an
obligation to participate actively in deliberations so as to indicate a present
intention to find a basis for agreement. . . . Not only must the employer have
an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement, but a sincere effort
must be made to reach a common ground."
16
In determining whether there
has been good faith bargaining, the courts and labor boards consider the
totality of the parties' conduct throughout the negotiations. Thus, while an
employer has a clear right to insist upon a management rights clause,
1 7
it has
been held that an employer's good faith is suspect if it insists on retaining
such absolute unilateral control over wages, hours and working conditions that
it in effect would require the union to waive practically all of its statutory
rights.
1 8
A classic example of a case in which the NLRB looked at the totality of
conduct is the case of General Electric (GE).
1 9 GE's approach to bargaining-
called Boulwarism involved several different elements, including the sub-
mission of a firm offer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a massive communications
campaign, and what in effect amounted to an end run to the employees. In
finding that this approach to bargaining did not comport with an employer's
obligation to negotiate in good faith, the NLRB stated:
a party who enters bargaining negotiations with a take it or leave it
attitude violates its duty to bargain although it goes through the forms
of bargaining, does not insist on any illegal or nonmandatory bargaining
proposals and wants to sign an agreement. For good faith bargaining
means more than 'going through the motions of bargaining'. . . . '[T]he
essential thing is rather the serious intent to adjust differences and to
reach an acceptable common ground'. ... On the part of the employer,
it requires at a minimum recognition that the statutory representative is
the one with whom it must deal in conducting bargaining negotiations, and
that it can no longer bargain directly or indirectly with the employees. It is
inconsistent with this obligation for an employer to mount a
campaign, as Respondent did, both before and during negotiations, for
the purpose of disparaging and discrediting the statutory representative
in the eyes of its employee constituents, to seek to persuade the
employees to exert pressure on the representative to submit to the will
of the employer, and to create the impression that the employer rather
than the union is the true protector of the employees' interests. . . .
'[T]he employer's statutory obligation is to deal with the employees
thru the union, and not with the union thru the employees.'
20
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It should be specifically noted, however, that it is not ordinarily illegal
for an employer to advise its employees of what is occurring at the bargaining
table. As one court noted in construing its public sector act: "The act does
not prohibit an employer from communicating in noncoercive terms with his
employees while collective negotiations are in progress. . . . The element of
negotiation is critical. Another crucial factor in these cases is whether or not
the communication is designed to undermine and denigrate the union."
2 1
General Bargaining Guidelines
While it is impossible to set forth ironclad rules on how to fulfill the
obligation to bargain in good faith, the following general guidelines may be
helpful:
1. Select negotiators with meaningful authority to engage in the give and
take of negotiations.
2. Provide, upon request, relevant information in a timely fashion.
3. Do not take unilateral action on matters that are subject to negotiations
unless and until such matters have been presented to the union's bar-
gaining team and the parties are at impasse on those matters. It should
be noted that this prohibition does not apply during the term of an
existing collective bargaining agreement under which the employer has
specifically or implicitly retained the right to take the action in
question.
22
4. Do not make proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This does not mean,
however, that after a reasonable period of negotiations an employer
cannot legitimately state its final position. For example, in Philip Carey
Mfg.,
23
the NLRB held that an employer did not commit an unfair
labor practice when it made a final offer at the eleventh meeting after
having participated in the traditional give-and-take of negotiation.
5. Do not communicate proposals to employees until after they have been
presented to the union's bargaining team across the bargaining table.
6. Avoid categorical statements such as: "We will never sign a contract."
7. Take good notes at bargaining sessions. Good notes serve a two-fold
purpose: (1) they are helpful in reconstructing what actually occurred in
negotiations if it is ever necessary to defend against a charge of refusing
to bargain in good faith; (2) negotiating notes are often useful in terms
of ascertaining the intent of the parties in agreeing to given provisions in
the contract. As such, they can be extremely useful in terms of ad-
ministering the contract and in presenting evidence of the parties' intent
in arbitration proceedings. Parenthetically, it should be noted that it is
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generally indicative of bad faith bargaining for one party to insist that
there be a verbatim transcript of negotiations or that negotiations be
tape recorded.
24 As the NLRB stated: "many authorities and practi-
tioners in the field are of the opinion that the presence of a stenog-
rapher at [bargaining] meetings has an inhibiting effect. The use of a
stenographer or mechanical recorder to create a verbatim transcript does
tend to encourage negotiators to concentrate upon and speak for the
purpose of making a record rather than to direct their efforts toward a
solution of the issues before them."2 5 However, nothing prohibits both
parties from agreeing to have a verbatim transcript of negotiations.
THE SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS
The determination of the scope of negotiations in the public sector is
considerably more complex and difficult than in the private sector.
26 As one
commentator has observed: "In the private sector the employer's right to design
and control the kind and quality of a product he wishes has been relatively
unchallenged. In education, many of the demands frequently made in
negotiations challenge these same professional prerogatives."
27
Thus, the NBA,
in its Guidelines for Professional Negotiations, states:
A professional group has responsibilities beyond self-interest, including a
responsibility for the general welfare of the school system. Teachers
and other members of the professional staff have an interest in the
conditions which attract and retain a superior teaching force, in the
in-service training programs, in class size, in the selection of textbooks,
and in other matters which go far beyond those which would be
included in a narrow definition of working conditions. Negotiations
should include all matters which affect the quality of the educational
system."
28
Many others, however, feel that such policy matters must be excluded
from bilateral collective negotiations. Wellington and Winter, for example,
have observed: "The issue is not a threshold one of whether professional
public employees should participate in decisions about the nature of the
services they provide. Any properly run governmental agency should be
interested in, and heavily reliant upon, the judgment of its professional staff.
The issue rather is the method of that participation."
29
Wellington and Winter
concluded that if the scope of bargaining was not effectively limited, it
"would, in many cases, institutionalize the power of public employee unions
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in a way that would leave competing groups in the political process at a
permanent and substantial disadvantage."
30 The resolution of this funda-
mental conflict has occupied the attention of not only state legislatures, but
also the various labor boards and courts which are charged with the respon-
sibility of deciding what the parties must negotiate.
Any discussion of the scope of negotiations usually begins with a review
of what the applicable statute provides. Rather than spelling out in elaborate
detail what subjects are negotiable, virtually all of the public sector statutes
define the obligation in generic terms. In fact, most statutes use the same
wording found in the NLRA, i.e., the parties are required to negotiate in good
faith "with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment." In one case where a teacher bargaining statute referred to only
wages and other terms and conditions of employment and made no reference
to hours, the court held that the omission "evidences a legislative judgment
that teachers' 'hours of employment' determine students' hours of educaton
and that this is an important educational policy which should be reserved to
the board of education."31 As a result, the court held that "the length of the
school day and school calendar are not mandatory subjects of negotiation."
3 1
In determining the scope of negotiations, then, the initial inquiry is with
respect to what falls within the phrase "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment." Under the NLRA, if a subject is deemed to fall
within this area, it is considered to be a mandatory subject of bargaining.
32 A
mandatory subject of bargaining is defined as a subject over which the parties
must negotiate and over which the parties may insist upon to the point of
impasse. Among the subjects that have been held to be mandatory subjects of
bargaining are pensions, paid vacations, holidays, merit increases, incentives,
bonuses, health and accident insurance programs, meal allowances, no-strike
clause, management rights clause, severance pay, reporting pay, subcontracting,
overtime, premium pay, shift work, and grievance procedures. It is an unfair
labor practice for a party to refuse to negotiate over a mandatory subject of
negotiation. Moreover, an employer's sincere belief that a proposal is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining is not a valid defense.
33
Mandatory subjects of bargaining are to be distinguished from permissive
and illegal subjects of bargaining. A permissive subject of bargaining is one
which a party can legally propose, but which cannot be insisted upon to the
point of impasse. Examples include a demand that the other party withdraw
an unfair labor practice charge, a proposal that the employer's last offer be
voted upon by the employees prior to any strike occurring, and a proposal
that the bargaining unit be expanded to include additional employees not
previously covered. An illegal subject of bargaining is one which would be
illegal for the parties to include in an agreement, e.g., a union security clause
which is contrary to law.
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Despite the expansive interpretation of the number of mandatory sub-
jects that fall within the phrase "wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment," the courts have repeatedly held that the scope of nego-
tiations is not unqualified. Thus, in a recent case the Supreme Court stated
that the NLRA "does establish a limitation against which proposed topics
must be measured."34 The most significant limitation is with respect to
matters that are deemed to go to the core of entrepreneurial control. In
Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB,
35
Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion noted:
While employment security has thus properly been recognized in various
circumstances as a condition of employment, it surely does not follow
that every decision which may affect job security is a subject of
compulsory collective bargaining. Many decisions made by management
affect the job security of employees. Decisions concerning the volume
and kind of advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of
financing, and sales, all may bear upon the security of the workers' jobs.
Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve "conditions of
employment" that they must be negotiated with the employees' bar-
gaining representative.
In many of these areas the impact of a particular management
decision upon job security may be extremely indirect and uncertain, and
this alone may be sufficient reason to conclude that such decisions are
not "with respect to ... conditions of employment." Yet there are
other areas where decisions by management may quite clearly imperil
job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely. An enterprise
may decide to invest in labor-saving machinery. Another may resolve to
liquidate its assets and go out ot business. Nothing the Court holds
today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively
regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entre-
preneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves
primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the
decision may be necessarily to terminate employment. ... [T]hose
management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a
corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment
security should be excluded from that area.
36
Significantly, other courts and public employee relations boards have
accepted the concept that "management decisions which are fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise" are not mandatory subjects of
negotiation. For example, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission
has held that it "will not order bargaining in those cases where the subjects are
demonstrably within the core of entrepreneurial control."
37 While the
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Michigan commission acknowledged that "such subjects may affect interests of
employees," it stated that "it did not believe that such interests outweigh the
right to manage."
37 As the Connecticut Supreme Court recently stated, "the
notion that decisions concerning the 'core of entrepreneurial control' are
solely the business of the employer appears to have a special kind of vitality
in the public sector."
38
The New York Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) has adopted a
similar approach. In its New Rochelle School District decision it held that
decisions concerning the number of employees and whether a given service
should be curtailed were not mandatory subjects of negotiation: "The deter-
mination as to the manner and means by which education service is rendered
and the extent of such service is the duty and obligation of the public
employer. A public employer should not be required to delegate this respon-
sibility. The decisions of a public employer as to the carrying out of its
mission a decision to eliminate or curtail a service are not decisions that a
public employer should be compelled to negotiate with its employees."
39 The
New York PERB further noted that the underlying rationale "was the concept
that basic decisions as to public policy should not be made in the isolation of
a negotiation table, but should be made by those having the direct and sole
responsibility therefor and whose actions in this regard are subject to review
in the electoral process."
39
In Board of Higher Education of New York City, the New York PERB
held that student membership on a faculty evaluation committee is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The New York PERB stated that: "the
composition of committees that evaluate employees is not a term or condition
of the employees being evaluated."
40
In hesitating to allow college teachers to
shut out nonfaculty members, the board noted that policy questions about a
university's responsibilities "often involved issues of social concern to many
groups within the community other than the public employer's administrative
apparatus and its employees. It would be a perversion of collective nego-
tiations to impose it as a technique for resolving such dispute and thus
disenfranchising other interested groups."
4 Member Joseph Crowley
dissented, rejecting what he regarded as the majority's overreliance on trans-
posing an industrial model of collective bargaining into an academic setting.
He noted that appointment and promotion matters have traditionally been
matters for mandatory negotiation.
In a recent case the Kansas Supreme Court was faced with the task of
defining what was negotiable under the Kansas teacher statute which requires
the parties to negotiate in good faith "with respect to terms and conditions of
professional service."
41
In addition to wages and other economic matters, the
court held that negotiations were required over "such things as probationary
period, transfers, teacher appraisal procedure, disciplinary procedure, and
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resignation and termination of contracts."
41 On the other hand, the court
held that negotiations were not required over "curriculum and materials,
payroll mechanics, certification, class size and the use of para-professionals,
the use and duties of substitute teachers, and teachers' ethics and academic
freedom."4 1 The court stated that "the key ... is how direct the impact of
an issue is on the well-being of the individual teacher, as opposed to its effect
on the operation of the school system as a whole."
4
In a case under the New Jersey act, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a college board of trustees is not required to negotiate over the length of
the college year or the placement of vacations since these matters involve
major educational policy determinations which traditionally have been the
exclusive responsibility of the board of trustees.
42
After noting that the lines
concerning what is negotiable "may often be indistinct," the court stated:
[The lines] drawn by the Burlington Board of Trustees seem to us to
have fairly effectuated the legislative goals. It negotiated on the matters
directly and intimately affecting the faculty's working terms and con-
ditions, such as compensation, hours, work loads, sick leaves, personal
and sabbatical leaves, physical accommodations, grievance procedures,
etc. It declined to negotiate the major educational policy of the calendar
though it did make provision in its goverance structure for a calendar
committee with student, faculty and administration representatives.
While, in the interests of sound labor relations, it might well have also
discussed the subject with officially designated representatives of the
Association, it was under no legal mandate to do so.
3
In another case the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a school
board's decision to consolidate the chairmanships of two department was
predominantly a matter of educational policy and was not, therefore, a term
or condition of employment.
44
Effect of Statutory Statement
of Management Prerogatives
The determination of the scope of negotiations in the public sector does
not end with a review of whether a given subject falls within the area of
"wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." In many
situations, a given topic might very well be deemed to fall within this phrase,
but is nevertheless not a subject for mandatory negotiation because of a
statutory reservation of management rights or because it conflicts with civil
service rules and regulations. The effect of a statutory statement of manage-
ment prerogatives on the scope of bargaining will be reviewed first.
Because certain matters have been deemed to be vital to the operation
of government, many of the public sector statutes specifically exclude
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designated managerial prerogatives from the scope of bargaining. This follows
the lead of the federal government in Executive Order 11491, which contains
the following reservation of management rights:
Management officials of the agency retain the right, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations
(1) to direct employees of the agency;
(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions
within the agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other
disciplinary action against employees;
(3) to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or for
other legitimate reasons;
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government operations entrusted
to them;
(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which such
operations are to be conducted; and
(6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the mission
of the agency in situations of emergency.
The Hawaii, Kansas and Nevada statutes have similar provisions. Moreover, a
number of other states provide that public employers are not required to
bargain over certain matters. For example, the Pennsylvania act provides that
"public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of
discretion or policy as the function and programs of the public employer,
standards of services, its overall budget, utilizations of technology, the organi-
zational structure and selection and direction of personnel."
In the past several years the Federal Labor Relations Council (FLRC)
and the various state and local labor relations agencies have been called upon
to interpret the effect of a statutory statement of management prerogatives on
the scope of bargaining. In Department of the Army Corps of Engineers?
5
the FLRC ruled that a union's request to negotiate on rotating shift work
schedules was negotiable. It rejected the agency's argument that the union's
proposal would be contrary to the right of management under Section
12(bX4) of Executive Order 11491: "to maintain the agency of Government
operations entrusted to them." In so ruling, the FLRC stated:
In general, agency determinations as to negotiability made in
relation to the concept of efficiency and economy in section 12(b)(4) of
the Order and similar language in the statutes require consideration and
balancing of all the factors involved, including the well-being of em-
ployees, rather than an arbitrary determination based only on the
anticipation of increased costs. Other factors such as the potential for
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improved performance, increased productivity, responsiveness to direc-
tion, reduced turnover, fewer grievances, contribution of money-saving
ideas, improved health and safety, and the like, are valid considerations.
We believe that where otherwise negotiable proposals are involved the
management right in section 12(b)(4) may not properly be invoked to
deny negotiations unless there is a substantial demonstration by the
agency that increased costs or reduced effectiveness in operations are
inescapable and significant and not offset by compensating benefits.45
This decision should be contrasted with the FLRC's earlier decision in Plum
Island Animal Disease Laboratory, wherein it held that "the number of its
work shifts or tours of duty, and the duration of the shifts, comprise an
essential and integral part of the 'staffing patterns' necessary to perform the
work of the agency" and, therefore, was not negotiable since the Executive
Order reserved to management the right to determine "the numbers, types or
grades of positions for employees assigned to an organizational unit, work
project or tour of duty."
4 6
The Hawaii act likewise contains a fairly explicit management rights
provision. In Hawaii State Teachers Association and Department of Educa-
tion*'1 the Hawaii Public Employee Relations Board held that a proposal
concerning the average class size ratio was negotiable despite the employer's
contention that this was a managerial prerogative reserved under the statute.
In a subsequent decision, however, the Hawaii Public Employment Relations
Board ruled that a proposal concerning work load which would fix the
maximum number of students per teacher was not negotiable. After noting
that the proposal involved "both educational policy-making and has a sig-
nificant impact on working conditions," the Hawaii board determined "that it
so interfere [d] with management's right to establish management educational
policy and operate the school system efficiently as to render it non--
negotiable."
48 The board's rationale was as follows:
It is our opinion that the specific proposal on work load which is here
at issue, while admittedly concerned with a condition of employment
because it may affect the amount of work expected of a teacher,
nevertheless, in far greater measure, interferes with the DOE's respon-
sibility to establish policy for the operation of the school system, which
cannot be relinquished if the DOE is to fulfill its mission of providing a
sound educational system and remaining responsive to the needs of the
students while striving to maintain efficient operations. Hence, the DOE
and the HSTA may not agree to the subject work load proposal because
such agreement would interfere substantially with the DOE's right to
determine the methods, means, and personnel by which it conducts its
operations and would interfere with its responsibility to the public to
maintain efficient operations.
49
In the State Area College District case, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
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Board vacillated with respect to the interpretation and application of the
management rights proviso set forth in the Pennsylvania act. After initially
ruling that some twenty-one proposals, ranging from class size to the elimin-
ation of the requirement that teachers chaperone athletic activities, were
covered by the proviso and that a school board was not therefore required to
negotiate on these matters,
50
the board reconsidered its initial decision and
held that many of the twenty-one items which it had previously ruled
nonnegotiable were, in fact, negotiable.
51 On appeal, the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that all of the twenty-one proposals in question
were covered by the management rights proviso in that they concerned
matters of inherent managerial policy. The court, in relevant part, stated:
We must conclude that school boards have traditionally been given by
the Legislature, under constitutional mandates, broad inherent mana-
gerial powers to operate the public schools and to determine policy
relative thereto. If Act 195 represents a departure from the traditional
principle of our public schools being operated and managed by school
boards, it would be a sharp departure not to be presumed but the result
of clear legislative declaration. . . .
Matters of "inherent managerial policy" over which public em-
ployers are not obligated to bargain are such matters that belong to the
public employer as a natural prerogative or essential element of the right
(1) to manage the affairs of its business, operation or activity and (2) to
make decisions that determine the policy and direction that the
business, operation or activity shall pursue.
5 2
The California Meyers-Milias-Brown Act authorizes negotiations over
"wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," but exempts
from the scope of negotiation the "consideration of the merits, necessity, or
organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." In
County of Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services v. Los
Angeles County Employees Association,
53
the California Court of Appeals
upheld a decision of the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission
that the number of cases assigned to welfare workers is a working condition
and therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining. In balancing the conflicting
provisions of the ordinance, the court stated: "The problem of interpreting
these sections, and their relationship to each other, is that an argument can
plausibly be made that all management decisions affect areas of mandatory
service to the public and the working conditions of public employees; or,
conversely, that all decisions rendered concerning a public employee labor
dispute of necessity will determine the quality of mandated public service and
the operation of management."
53 The court noted that it could find no
reason why a public employer could not discuss the question of case load in
light of "wages, hours and other conditions of employment," even though the
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"merits, necessity, or organization" of the service being rendered are excluded
from negotiations.
The Nevada Local Government Employee Relations Act contains a fairly
lengthy provision which reserves to public employers numerous rights "with-
out negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from negotiation." In
Washoe County School District, the Nevada Local Government Employee -
Management Relations Board held, inter alia, that proposals concerning class
size, student discipline, school calendar, and teacher load were nevertheless
negotiable. The board held "that any matter significantly related to wages,
hours and working conditions is negotiable, whether or not said matters also
relate to questions of management prerogative ; and it is the duty of the local
government employer to proceed and negotiate said items."
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Effect of Civil Service Laws
on Scope of Negotiations
Prior to the advent of wide-scale collective bargaining in the public
sector, the terms and conditions of employment for many public employees
were established pursuant to civil service rules and regulations. In the public
sector, these civil service rules and regulations were the counterpart to the
collective bargaining agreement in the private sector. The enactment of public
sector collective bargaining legislation has raised the question as to the extent,
if any, to which preexisting civil service rules and regulations are superseded
by collective bargaining. The legislative response has differed from state to
state. The Michigan act, for example, is completely silent on the matter. As a
result, the parties and eventually the courts have had to attempt to resolve the
many conflicts that have arisen. The Michigan Supreme Court, noting that it
had "to guess what the 1965 legislature would have done had the point come
to its attention," held that the 1965 public employee bargaining law "must be
implemented and administered exclusively as provided therein" and that the
authority of civil service commissions was "diminished pro tanto by the
(public employee labor relations] act of 1965, to the extent of free admin-
istration of the latter according to its tenor."
5 5
On the other hand, some states have provided, in effect, that existing
civil service rules and regulations should not be impeded by collective bar-
gaining. For example, the Massachusetts act for municipal employees provides
that nothing in the act "shall diminish the authority and power of the civil
service commission, or any retirement board or personnel board established by
law." The New Hampshire statute for state employees provides, not unlike
Executive Order 11491, that "all collective bargaining agreements shall at all
times be subject to existing or future laws and all valid regulations adopted
pursuant thereto."
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The third legislative approach is to provide that certain core essentials of
the merit principle i.e., the holding and granting of merit examinations and
the appointment of employees from lists established by such examinations-
are not negotiable, but with respect to all other matters where there is a
conflict between the collective bargaining agreement and the rules and regu-
lations adopted by a personnel board or civil service commission, the terms of
such agreement shall prevail. This approach has been adopted in Connecticut.
The conflict between civil service and the scope of bargaining under
public sector collective bargaining laws is clearly revealed in Laborer's Inter-
national Union of North America, Local 1029 v. State of Delaware.
56 At
issue was the negotiability of union proposals concerning pay for holiday
work, paid union leave, premium pay for double shift work, use of accumu-
lated sick leave for vacation purposes, hazardous duty pay, and reimbursement
for accumulated sick leave upon voluntary resignation. The court, noting that
the Delaware Public Sector Bargaining Law provides for negotiations on
"matters concerning wages, salaries, hours, vacations, sick leave, grievance
procedures and other terms and conditions of employment," stated that each
of the union's proposals fell within the defined area of negotiations and
therefore was a
"proper subject for collective bargaining." The court noted,
however, that "difficulty arises when one attempts to reconcile the Union's
demands for collective bargaining with the provisions and purposes of the
State's Merit System of Personnel Administration." After noting that "both
the Merit System and the right of public employees to organize are of
relatively recent origin," the court stated:
Having studied the statutes and the available legislative history, I am of
the opinion that where there is uncertainty as to areas where the
General Assembly has indicated a clear intention to deny collective
bargaining, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the merit system.
The Merit System has been instituted to create a uniformity of protection
and treatment for public employees. The sections listed in section 5938(c)
are those in which uniformity of treatment would seem most essential if
the system is to have meaning, particularly those which attempt to deal
with classification based on ability, equal compensation for commensurate
ability and responsibility, promotions and time off from work with pay. If
each agency is to bargain with the bargaining representative of its
employees on such things as the amount of pay for holidays and double
shifts worked, the amount of authorized leave with pay, the use of
accumulated sick leave as additional vacation with pay, etc., then the
obvious result will be to have employees of the same classifications
receiving different compensation and different leave arrangements for
different purposes based solely upon the agency they work for and the
success of their collective bargaining representatives. Section 5938(c)
seems designed to prevent this while the remainder of the statute allows
for bargaining on various other matters. I am therefore reluctant to
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expand the scope of collective bargaining so as to effectively encroach
upon rules adopted pursuant to the statutes protected by Section
5938(c) without clear legislative direction to do so (emphasis added).56
The court noted that:
"[its] decision should not be taken to indicate a negative
attitude in this State towards the rights of public employees. Rather it is an
attempt to reconcile conflicts inherent in a public employment program which
contemplates both merit system protection as well as collective bargaining
rights for State employees."
5 7
An example of the type of conflict that arises is indicated in the
decision of the Orgeon Public Employe Relations Board in University of
Oregon Medical School and the State Personnel Division.5 * There the Oregon
State Employee Association represented 90 percent of the physical plant
employees employed by the state, with the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees representing the remaining 10 percent.
When AFSCME requested negotiations with respect to salaries for the physical
plant employees which it represented, the personnel division proposed that
negotiations on economic matters be conducted jointly with both AFSCME
and the Oregon State Employe Association; it refused to negotiate separately
with AFSCME on salaries and wages. In this regard, the personnel division
relied on a provision of the merit system law which provided that salaries of
employees in any classification in the classified state service were to be
uniform. In rejecting the contentions of the personnel division, the Oregon
board stated:
Even if it be true that the statute requires a single rate, this does not
foreclose the obligation to bargain with the smaller unit nor does it
force the smaller unit to sit by submissively while the larger group has
determined its fate. We cannot catalog all of the possible results of
bargaining with the smaller unit but, as examples of possible results, it
might be that the smaller unit would be persuaded to accept the pre-set
rates or that the Department would agree to some different and higher
rates which might then become the standard for all employes. It is also
possible that the parties would reach an impasse. It is also conceivable
that ORS 240.235(3), while requiring a uniform rate, does not require
that the rate be uniform throughout the state but only in geographical
areas.
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Effect of Statutes, Charter
Provisions and Ordinances
In addition to the conflict between civil service laws and collective
bargaining, there is also a conflict with other state statutory provisions,
municipal charters, and ordinances. In Detroit Police Officers Association v.
City of Detroit,
60
one of the questions raised was whether the city of Detroit
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was required to bargain with respect to certain changes in the retirement
system where such changes were incorporated in a city charter provision
which had been approved by the electrorate. In holding that the duty to
bargain under the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act superseded city
charter provisions, the court stated: "It takes little insight to appreciate what
a municipal employer and its electrorate could do to the collective bargaining
process if this procedure were allowed to stand. Any 'Home Rule' city could
merely write its pension and retirement system into its charter, and insulate
any change therein from negotiations and settlement save with electoral
approval. This to us is the exact converse of what the Legislature intended
when it inserted bargaining rights for public employees into the statute."
61
Similarly, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) in
Racine County, ruled that whether salary increases were retroactive was
negotiable, rejecting the employer's contention that retroactive payments were
prohibited by a county ordinance. The WERC stated that "what the County
enacted with respect to retroactivity, it can repeal if it so desires."
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In Waterbury Teachers Association v. City of Waterbury,
63
the Con-
necticut Supreme Court held that a board of education had a duty to
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment of principals even though
the job specifications of the principals had been established by civil service
rules and regulations adopted pursuant to a city charter. The court noted that
principals as certified professional employees were covered by the Connecticut
Teacher Negotiation Act and that therefore the provisions of the state act
mandating negotiations were applicable "notwithstanding ... the Waterbury
Charter and the civil service rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto."
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Effect of Legislative and
Appropriation Process
In Rutgers Council of the American Association of University Professors v.
The New Jersey Board of Higher Education
65 the court held that a state board
of higher education did not violate the state's public sector bar-
gaining law when it unilaterally adopted a student-faculty ratio funding for-
mula applicable to the university, notwithstanding the union's contention that
the formula imposed certain work loads, class sizes, class hours, etc., on the
university's faculty. In so ruling, the court stated:
The Board's right to make a budget recommendation for Rutgers
was intended by the Legislature to be exercised freely, and in a manner
that would enable it to receive an independent and analytical assessment
of the budgetary needs of the University. As respondents point out, if
the Employer-Employee Relations Act were construed to compel
collective negotiations on the budget recommendations given to the
Legislature by the Board, this obvious legislative intent would be
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frustrated, for the recommendations it made each year would reflect
compromise and not the Board's independent judgment. As we have
remarked earlier in this opinion, any member of a public or private
interest group may examine any budget recommendation made by the
Board and, if so minded, submit his views and appropriate data with
regard thereto to the executive and legislative branches of government.
This, and not collective negotiation, is the proper avenue for interested
parties to follow.
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Collective bargaining in the public sector is in many respects at the same
stage of development as collective bargaining was in the private sector in the
late 1930s. Like the private sector then, the public sector is beset with
considerable uncertainty as to what the obligation to bargain in good faith
means and what the scope of bargaining is. While much remains to be
resolved, it is not unreasonable to suggest that as precedents are established to
govern the conduct of the parties at the bargaining table and as the para-
meters of bargaining become more firmly established, the uncertainty and
militancy that often accompanies public sector bargaining today will decrease.
That, at least, was the experience in the private sector. I am not suggesting
that the problems are easy or that everything will eventually work out
satisfactorily for all concerned. I do suggest, that, as the parties become more
experienced in their relatively new roles and as institutional changes are made
to accommodate to the reality of collective bargaining, the crisis, conflict and
confrontation that permeates much of public sector bargaining will begin to
recede.
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